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Comments
DEFAMATION-CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE
IN LOUISIANA
PART Twot

FairComment and Public Interest
Two rather similar privileges, accorded perhaps more by the
tradition and heritage of the American people than any other
factor, are those of "fair comment" and "protection of public
t This is the second of two installments on this subject. Included are
the privilege of fair comment, the privilege to defame for the protection of
the public, a topic entitled freedom of the press, together with the topic of
abuse of the conditional privilege to defame. The first installment contained
the privileges to defame for self protection, for common interest, for the
protection of a third party, and for the protection of the recipient.
[417]
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interest." Many situations may arise in the law of defamation
where either or both of these privileges might be advantageously
employed. Although founded on entirely separate and distinct
bases, each one of these privileges claims for its primary purpose
the ready informing of an ignorant public of any and all fraudulent practices being carried on in governmental bodies of the
nation, any vice or corruption which may be found lurking in
any of the public projects being currently carried out, or of
suspicious or unethical actions on the part of any public officer,
any candidate for public office, or any other person upon whom
a versatile public eye has been cast. In general, these privileges
embrace any affair of -general public concern.
The privilege of fair comment, the right to express one's
opinion concerning public affairs, affords a rather broad immunity to one who would make his views public. The right, however, extends only to comments upon facts which are true.2 3 A
false assertion of fact will not be excused under this privilege,
regardless of good faith on the part of the publisher. While it is
considered by the courts that the benefits gained by allowing
freedom of expression in situations of this sort outweigh any
damage which may be caused by the communication, yet they
have refused to go so far as to say that one who bases his disparaging commentary on a fact which is untrue shall not be
liable, regardless of the intrusion he thereby makes upon the
equally important right of every man to live and maintain his
reputation free from unwarranted suspicion.
In Cadro v. Plaquemines Gazette,24 the court held that
although a newspaper or other public journal has the right to
comment fairly, even to criticize severely, the actions of any
public officer while acting in official capacity, that that comment
or criticism must be based upon true facts. In the case of Naihaus
v. Louisiana Weekly Publishing Company,25 the defendant newspaper had published defamatory statements concerning plaintiff's dealings with his customers. The court held that this publi23. Levert v. Daily States Pub. Co., 123 La. 594, 49 So. 206 (1909); Smith
v. Lyons, 142 La. 975, 77 So. 896 (1917); Cadro v. Plaquemines Gazette, 202
La. 1, 11 So.(2d) 10 (1942).
24. 202 La. 1, 11 So.(2d) 10 (1942).
25. 176 La. 240, 145 So. 527 (1932). However, it would appear that this
case may have been wrongfully decided. Careful examination of the case
discloses no substantial misstatement of fact. Rather, the defamatory statements would seem to be merely an exaggerated comment based upon true
facts. This case was, perhaps, decided more with a distinct social policy in
view than under the technical laws of defamation,
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cation was not privileged as a fair comment, since defendant was
unable to prove the truth of his allegations.

The courts have repeatedly recognized the theory that when
a man places himself before the public as a candidate for public
office, or is elected to public office, or assumes .any other position
of general interest to the public, he also places his every word
or action before the community as a proper subject for fair comment and criticism. The leading Louisiana case on this subject
is Flannagan v. Nicholson Publishing Company.26 The plaintiff,
a national officer of a labor union, was in Washington at a time
when New Orleans was bidding against San Francisco for the
Pan American Exposition. Although a resident of New Orleans,
plaintiff used his influence in favor of San Francisco. Defendant,
a New Orleans newspaper, published an article in which plaintiff
was severely criticised for his action, and in which he was impliedly accused of having accepted a bribe from the Southern
Pacific Railway Company. The court held the statement to be
privileged, saying that when a person takes an active part in a
campaign in which public opinion is sought to be molded, he
automatically becomes subject to attack and ridicule as a public
character who is taking part in a matter of general public interest.
The rule of law, as stated by the court, is one which has received
universal recognition; however, it seems that plaintiff should
have been allowed to recover for the charges of bribery which
were made against him. It has since been held that when an
attack is made upon the character or motives of a public officer,
the truth of the statement must be shown in order to relieve the
27
publisher of liability.
In a very strong minority of jurisdictions, the privilege of
defaming another in the public interest is differentiated from
'the privilege of fair comment. These courts maintain that defamation in the public interest is privileged regardless of the truth or
falsity of the statements, whereas the privilege of fair comment
extends only to comment or criticism based upon facts which
are true.28 Most writers believe this view to be the better one.
The Louisiana courts, however, are in accord with the majority
rule in holding that the privilege of public discussion is limited
to comment or opinion, and does not extend to false assertion
26. 137 La. 588, 68 So. 964 (1915).

27. Hall v. Ewing, 140 La. 907, 74 So. 190 (1917).
28. Prosser, A Handbook of the Law of Torts (1941) 839-841.
cited in 110 A.L.R. 412 (1937).

See cases
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of fact.29 The reason usually given is that men in public life are
not to be subjected to such attacks without redress, lest desirable
candidates be thereby deterred from seeking public office. Most
of the common law states are retreating gradually from this
position.
Discharge of a Public Duty
According to Louisiana law, apparently the only situation
connected with public interest where the privilege extends to
false assertion of fact is where a public official defames another
while in discharge of a public duty. Legislators, special appointees in legislative investigations, judges, and witnesses in
judicial proceedings are, of course, protected by this privilege.
However, the Louisiana rule concerning statements made in
judicial proceedings differs from that of the common law, which
grants, in such cases, an absolute privilege. There was a conflict
in the earlier Louisiana cases on this point-some courts holding
to the doctrine of absolute privilege, while others admitted the
existence of only a qualified privilege. The court in Lescale v.
Joseph Schwartz Company,"0 after reviewing the earlier decisions,
laid down what apparently is the presently prevailing rule by
saying that such allegations are not privileged unless they are
founded on probable cause. This case has been subsequently
followed by the Louisiana courts.3 1
The legislative privilege in Louisiana seems to be about
equal in strength and extent to the privilege granted to witnesses
and jurors in judicial proceedings. In the case of Meteye v.
Times Democrat Publishing Company,3 2 the court held that a
physician employed by the town council was not liable for a
false statement made'in discharge of the duty which had been
delegated to him by the investigating committee. The court
explained the privilege of officials of a municipal corporation to
defame others before a meeting of the town council as being
analogous to that granted to a United States congressman or a
state legislator. A city council has been invested with subordinate legislative functions, and its members are conditionally
immune from liability for what is said by them pertinent to any
official investigation which is being made, or project which is
29. Otero v. Ewing, 162 La. 453, 110 So. 648 (1926); Otero v. Ewing, 165
La. 398, 115 So. 633 (1927). See also cases cited supra note 1.
30. 116 La. 293, 40 So. 708 (1905).
31. Robinson Mercantile Co. v. Freeman, 172 So. 797 (La. App. 1937).
32. 47 La. Ann. 824, 17 So. 314 (1895),
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being carried out. It would seem that while legislators are
almost absolutely privileged, yet the privilege is not so strong
as to withstand malice, excessive publication, or impertinency on
the part of the publisher.
Freedom of the Press
The newspaper has been given rather extensive privileges in
of both legislative and judicial proceedings. Reports
reporting
the
of legislative bodies are held privileged regardless of the size
or importance of the body. These proceedings are of the utmost
interest to the public, and their contents should be made public.
Newspapers have been held privileged to report proceedings
before congressional committees, 3 town councils 4 New Orleans
City council,3 5 and investigating committees,3 6 as well as reports
of public meetings." The privilege to report judicial proceedings
in Louisiana is relatively broad. While the privilege does not
include private investigations, it certainly is not confined strictly
to reports of proceedings in open court; in fact, it has been held
to extend to all quasi-judicial bodies whose proceedings are
likely to be of substantial interest or importance to the public.
In the most extreme case found, Rabb v. Trevelyan,3 8 it was
held that defendant newspaper was privileged to report proceedings before judges of the races who were investigating
certain actions of book makers. The court justified its position
by stating that the matter of fraudulent racing is one in which
the public has a great interest, and that the information ought,
therefore, to be made public. It has been held, however, that
a report of an insurance adjuster does not come within this
privilege. The court did not regard that field as being of sufficient concern to the public to warrant a wide publication of its
proceedings. 9
Once it is determined that the proceeding in question is of a
judicial character, there remains the inquiry as to whether the
defamatory remark was made within the course of the proceedings. The test here appears to be whether the communication
was made in the presence of the judicial officer during the pendency of the hearing. In one case, in which one attorney had
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Terry v. Fellows, 21 La. Ann. 375 (1869).
Wallis v. Bazet, 34 La. Ann. 131 (1882).
Meteye v. Times Democrat Pub. Co., 47 La. Ann. 824, 17 So. 314 (1895).
Terry v. Fellows, 21 La. Ann. 375 (1869).
Meteye v. Times Democrat Pub. Co., 47 La. Ann. 824, 17 So. 314 (1895).
122 La. 174, 47 So. 455 (1908).
Cooke v. O'Malley, 109 La. 382, 33 So. 377 (1902).
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accused another of unethical conduct, the court held that defendant newspaper was not privileged to report the statement, since
it was not made in the presence of a judge during process of
trial. 0
These reports must be accurately and impartially printed.
Any discrepancy between the report and the actual proceedings
may render the publisher liable for damages. This is true in a
situation where the publisher deviates from the report of the
actual proceeding, and expresses an opinion or makes implications which are obviously designed to sway public opinion one
way or another. However, if a defamatory statement made in
the course of the proceeding be incorrect, that fact alone will
not make the publisher liable.41 Nor will slight inaccuracies in
headlines defeat the privilege-especially when the text of the
42
article fully explains such headlines.
The rule in this state in regard to reports of police proceedings seems to be the same as that of the majority of common law
states. A newspaper may report the fact that a person has been
arrested, but it has no right to go beyond this and assume the
guilt of the person charged. 43 A newspaper is not privileged to
print reports made by detectives to their superiors which do not
come within the privilege of judicial proceedings.4 4 Such reports
are no more privileged. than would be the report of a private
individual.

Abuse of Privilege
Thus far, we have endeavored to ascertain the extent of
the conditional privilege in Louisiana. What is the purpose and
effect of the privilege in a defamation action? When a plaintiff
is able to show that a statement which is damaging to his character or business reputation has been published by the defendant, he thereby establishes a prima facie cause of action. No
malice on the part of defendant need be expressly shown, since
the courts have always found the "implication" of malice in the
publication of the defamatory statement itself. 45 Defendant,
40. Viosca v. Landfried, 140 La. 609, 73 So. 698 (1916).

41. Lenninger v. New Orleans Item Pub Co., 156 La. 1044, 101 So. 411
(1924).
42. Cooke v. O'Malley, 109 La. 382, 33 So. 377 (1902).
43. Tresca v. Maddox, 11 La. Ann. 206 (1856).

44. Billett v. Times Democrat Pub. Co., 107 La. 751, 32 So. 17 (1902).
45. Miller v. Holstein, 16 La. 389 (1880); Spotorno v. Fournichon, 40 La.
Ann. 423, 4 So. 71 (1888); Fellman v. Dreyfous, 47 La. Ann. 907, 17 So. 422
(1895).
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although admitting that the statement is defamatory in nature,
may then raise the defense of privilege. It is only at this point
that malice becomes important in the law of defamation. When
defendant has established the existence of his privilege, the
burden falls back to plaintiff to bring in further evidence, if he
can, which will show that defendant, although he had the privilege, in the first place, to make the communication, yet has
exceeded his right by some improper motive or action. If plaintiff does not succeed in showing malice, then the court must find
for the defendant. If malice sufficient to defeat the privilege is
shown, then a verdict must be rendered in favor of plaintiff.
Since a good proportion of defamation cases turn upon this
point-whether or not a privilege has been exceeded-the question of what constitutes malice becomes of major importance to
one who seeks to understand the nature of the action.
Malice is, in effect, a showing that defendant made the statement for some purpose other than that which the privilege was
designed to protect. Plaintiff may be able to do this in any one
of several different ways. He may succeed in proving that the
defendant made use of language more abusive than was warranted by the occasion, or that he was protecting an interest so
trivial as to be of no importance in comparison with the damage caused to plaintiff. He may attempt to prove that defendant
exhibited a lack of social discretion in making the statement at
that particular time and under those particular circumstances,
or he may show that the statement made would be of no particular value in the protection of the interest. An establishment of
any one of these five situations should defeat the privilege.
In Louisiana, in most of the cases in which the privilege has
been held to have been exceeded, the excess has consisted of the
use of unnecessarily abusive language. In Cass v. New Orleans
Times, 4 defendant had reiterated in an article published in its
newspaper charges made against plaintiff in an affidavit which
was made before the justice of the peace. The court held that
the privilege had been defeated, since defendant had, in the
course of the article, abused the occasion by asserting that the
charges were actually true. In Bernstein v. Commercial National
Bank ' the privilege of common interest was held defeated for
the same reason, the court finding that the defendant acted in
"bad faith" in making the statement. Another case in which the
46. 27 La. Ann 214 (1875).
47. 161 La. 38, 108, So. 117 (1926).
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language was held unnecessarily abusive was Tresca v. Maddox, 8
in which defendant called the plaintiff in a newspaper article "as
mild a man as ever scuttled a ship or cut a throat." The court
also held that the defendant's subsequent retraction of the statement should be considered only in mitigation of damages. In
another case, 9 the court allowed recovery upon a general showing of personal enmity between the parties involved. The language used, however, was extreme, charging plaintiff with being
of "an ungovernable temper, feeble minded, and unfit to teach."
That accusation, coupled with the factor of previous ill feeling
between the two parties, was enough to justify the court's
position.
MARTHA -E. KIRK
MoRRIs D. ROSENTHAL*

THE EFFECT OF DISCHARGES IN BANKRUPTCY ON
TORTS JUDGMENTS WITH RESPECT TO
KEEPING OF ANIMALS
Section 17(a) of the National Bankruptcy Act provides, "A
discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his
provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such
as ... (2) are liabilities ... for wilful and malicious injuries to
person or property of another .... -1
Undoubtedly the purpose and intention of Congress in enacting this measure was to allow the honest debtor to clean the
slate of his financial burden. But an exception was provided so
that the intentional tortfeasor would be unable to escape liability
through the expediency of a discharge in bankruptcy. This exception is quite applicable, and certainly appropriate, to cases involving intentional wrongs or when the defendant's conduct is grossly
shocking to moral sensibilities. However, in those cases where
the rule of absolute liability obtains, a person may be held in
48. 11 La. Ann. 206 (1856).

49. Sims v. Clark, 194 So. 123 (La. App. 1940).
* A substantial part of the research work which led to the preparation
of this comment was done by Mr. Rosenthal as a research project in the
Torts course at Louisiana State University. Mr. Rosenthal served as a
member of the armed forces and has been missing in action since December
13, 1944.
1. 52 Stat. 851, 11 U.S.C.A. § 35 (Supp. 1944).

